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I. Introduction
Recent cases in the United States, Europe, and Australia have
demonstrated quite clearly the choice of law problems associated with attempts
to regulate the Internet. Simply put, the Internet makes a universe of
339
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
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information available with the click of a mouse.' Many legal scholars have
written effusively about the transformative effect of the Internet on the
marketplace of ideas.2 Moreover, some have suggested that in order to realize
fully the benefits of the Internet, it must be exempted from generally applicable
local laws.3
For a variety of reasons, national governments are not likely to accept the
notion that the Internet should be free from direct regulation. Internet activity
bears upon too many important domestic interests for a nation to declare the
Internet immune from local laws.4 The sale or dissemination of child
pornography, for example, creates a market for materials that a just government
might wish to prevent. 5 Similarly, gambling operations on the web have
1. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 893-902 (2000) (noting the potential of the Internet to facilitate
a very real "marketplace of ideas" open to all but also observing that "[tihis high theory
contrasts rather markedly with the nature of actual discourse on the boards").
2. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5-6, 24-25
(1999) (arguing that the Internet presents unique regulatory problems); Lawrence Lessig, The
Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744-45 (1995) (arguing that the Internet has unique
characteristics that justify or require the creation of special regulatory rules); cf Frank H.
Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Clu. LEGAL F. 207, 207-08, 2 10-
14 (arguing that the Internet does not present any unique problems or characteristics that would
preclude application of the existing legal order to the Internet); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. Cm-i. L. Rnv. 1199, 1201-02 (1998) (arguing that cyberspace regulation is
feasible from the perspectives of jurisdiction and choice of law).
3. See, e.g., James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997) (suggesting that the benefits of the
Internet can be realized only if government regulations do not suffocate it); Lidsky, supra note
1, at 932-44 (arguing that, in order to facilitate a robust marketplace of ideas and in light of
readers' skepticism toward web content, generally applicable tort defamation rules should not
apply to speech distributed via the Internet when the postings at issue relate to public figures or
matters of public concern and arguably fall within the opinion privilege).
4. See Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88
MINN. L. REV. 783, 871-74 (2004) (arguing that important national interests justify legal
regulation of the Internet when Internet activities have significant and foreseeable local effects).
5. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244-45 (2002) (invalidating a
federal statute banning virtual child pornography because the statute acted to proscribe a
substantial amount of lawful speech); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1990) (rejecting
a First Amendment challenge to a state statute designed to protect the victims of child
pornography). But see Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L.
REv. 209 (2001) (arguing that criminalization of child pornography, and the concomitant
stigmatization of those presented in it, cause at least some of the harm to children associated
with its production); Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 921, 925-
37, 961-69 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court has erred in adopting the view that erotic
materials featuring children presumptively enjoy no First Amendment protection, in light of the
reality that such materials sometimes possess significant artistic, literary, or scientific value).
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serious local effects that a government might feel compelled to address.
Finally, goods and services offered on the Internet might transgress legitimate
local laws. For example, the Internet sale of Nazi memorabilia, Oxycontin
tablets, or some other regulated product might undermine entirely a nation's
efforts to maintain and enforce its domestic laws within its own national
territory.
Accordingly, despite the fact that the idea of the Internet as a "wild
west"-a kind of frontier without borders, law givers, or law enforcers-has
substantial academic support, nation states will undoubtedly insist on applying
domestic law to Internet activity. The question then becomes: when local laws
conflict, to what extent may a country insist on applying its own domestic law
to Internet activity, even if the principal locus of the activity lies entirely
outside the jurisdiction? Defamation law, particularly the law of libel, presents
a good example of the problem.
II. The Problem Defined: Speech on the Internet Potentially Reaches a
Global, Rather Than Merely Local, Audience
Cases like Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co.7 make clear that some national
court systems, in at least some places, are not inclined to grant a blanket
exemption to Internet activity in order to facilitate the international exchange of
information and ideas. Defamation law, and particularly the law of libel,
presents many difficult questions for regulation of the Internet; materials posted
in one jurisdiction can be accessed with ease in another. Determining the place
of publication and the appropriate choice of law applicable to an Internet
posting constitute rather squirrelly questions.
Shawn A. Bone argues that with the emergence of the Internet, "the effect
of a statement became more and more powerful" and has now reached the point
that "communicators [have] the ability to send one line to the entire world
instantaneously."8 This fact leaves judges with two choices: either "divid[ing]
the cyber-world into sovereign territory through the interest of a physical state"
6. See generally Kurt Eggert, Truth in Gaming: Toward Consumer Protection in the
Gambling Industry, 63 MD. L. REv. 217 (2004); Bruce P. Keller, The Game's the Same: Why
Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569 (1999).
7. Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co. (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575 (Austl.).
8. Shawn A. Bone, Note, Private Harms in the Cyber- World: The Conundrum of
Choice ofLaw for Defamation Posed by Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
279, 290 (2005).
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or "leav[ing] the cyber-world to regulate itself in the name of freedom of
information."9
In my view, local courts will be strongly inclined to apply local law to
Internet activity that arguably occurs within their jurisdiction. The High Court
of Australia did so in Gutnick,'° the French domestic courts did so in the
Yahoo! case;" and Germany has acted to regulate Internet activity with
substantial effects in its territory, even if the file server at issue is located
abroad.'2 Bone acknowledges this state of affairs, observing that such "indirect
regulation" has taken place with "varying degrees of success."' 3
The likely effect of multiple nations asserting jurisdiction over the same
factual occurrences and applying local law is not particularly difficult to
predict--chaos. Moreover, as Bone suggests, "a user of the Internet has no
assurance that a given activity is legal on the Internet, even if it is legal when
not done on the Internet.' 4 He argues that decisions like Gutnick raise the
specter of "liability without end" for persons or entities publishing potentially
defamatory information on the Internet. "
The application of myriad local laws of defamation to Internet speech
could have a significant "chilling effect" on speech, not only abroad, but also in
the United States. "Because there is no way to isolate certain parts of the
Internet through controlled access from sections of the world, there is no doubt
that the media entity could be assured of limited liability [only] if it did not
convert print media to Internet media.' 6 Although media entities could engage
9. Id.
10. See Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 642 (finding that the law of Victoria was appropriate in
this case because the proceeding was founded on a local cause of action and that it was at least
"arguable" that the substantive law applicable to the case was that of Victoria).
11. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (describing judicial proceedings in France in which a French domestic
court applied to Yahoo!'s U.S.-based website French Criminal Code provisions that prohibit the
sale or exhibition of Nazi artifacts or propaganda), rev'd, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), reh 'g
granted, No. 01-17424, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 2166 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2005) (en banc); see
also Rosen, supra note 4, at 783, 790-91, 840, 868-78 (describing the Yahoo! case and arguing
that U.S. domestic courts should have enforced the French judgment against Yahoo.).
12. See John F. McGuire, Note, When Speech Is HeardAround the World: Internet Content
Regulation in the United States and Germany, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 750,768-71 (1999) (describing
Germany's efforts to police Internet activity by German residents in Germany regardless of the
point of origin of the content).
13. Bone, supra note 8, at 293.
14. Id. at298.
15. See id. at 306 ("The default choice of law rule adopted by the High Court [in Gutnick],
that of the situs of the harm, leaves Dow Jones facing liability without end.").
16. Id. at 309. Of course, the ability to isolate the nonelectronic media, although
significantly less difficult, is imperfect too; print materials often find their way quite far from home.
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in efforts to limit access to their websites, such efforts are unlikely to be
completely successful; accordingly, Bone's concerns about extended liability
for defamation appear well stated.
Resolution of the problem requires one of two things: either (1) a
voluntary decision by a local court to decline to apply its own law,
notwithstanding the fact that a local citizen's reputation has been harmed by
Internet speech; or (2) the creation of some sort of transnational system that
would undertake protection of personal reputation on the Internet. Bone,
arguing that the protection of trademarks and domain names through the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) potentially provides a good model
for the protection of reputation on the Internet, endorses the transnational
approach.17 Bone suggests that "[t]he WIPO arbitration forum has gone a long
way towards uniform regulation of trademark infringement on the Internet."'18
Of course, establishing an international forum for resolution of Internet
defamation disputes "would require formal international agreement, most likely
through a treaty or an accord."'19 And herein lies the problem with Bone's
preferred solution to the problem. If we could achieve international agreement
about the proper accommodation of reputation and free speech, a transnational
solution involving a WIPO-like entity could work very well. The problem,
however, is that a fundamental and deep-seated disagreement presently exists
among nations-even nations committed to protecting and facilitating free
speech-regarding the proper weighing of free speech versus protection of
personal reputation, dignity, and personal honor.
III. The Primacy of Reputation, Dignity, and Personal Honor over the
Freedom of Expression in Japan and Germany
Many industrial democracies, including, for example, Japan and Germany,
place much greater importance on the protection of personal reputation, dignity,
17. See id. at 318-21 (suggesting creation of an international treaty and an international
entity, established pursuant to the treaty, that would undertake resolution of transnational libel
disputes).
18. Id. at 321. But cf Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The Digital Trademark Right: A Troubling
New Extraterritorial Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REv. 483,524-29, 535-44 (2003)
(arguing that the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) has largely preempted
WIPO's system of protecting domain names and established the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as
the de facto international courts over domain name disputes because of ACPA's assertion of in
rem jurisdiction of domain names registered by Network Solutions, Inc. in Hemdon, Virginia).
19. Bone, supra note 8, at 322.
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and honor than they do on protecting the freedom of speech. 20 Indeed,
Professor Whitman has gone so far as to posit the existence of "honor" cultures
that systematically attempt to secure personal honor from slights both large and
small.2' To be clear, these nations are committed to freedom of expression as a
general matter and view free speech as essential to the project of deliberative
democracy, including free and fair elections. Moreover, respect for the rule of
law is a core legal and cultural value; the difference goes to the perceived
importance of freedom of expression relative to other rights-including
reputation, dignity, and personal honor-seen in these jurisdictions as
possessing an equally "fundamental" character.
In other words, the baseline approach reflected in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan22 has not garnered widespread acceptance in other nations; indeed, as I
will explain in greater detail, Germany expressly has rejected many of the core
assumptions that undergird the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sullivan. Before considering the examples provided by Japan and Germany, it
would be helpful to first engage in a brief overview of United States First
Amendment law regarding defamation. This will provide a clear sense of the
degree to which freedom of speech enjoys primacy over the protection of
personal reputation or honor in United States constitutional law.
A. A Brief Review of the Constitutionalization of United States Libel Law
Since the Supreme Court's Sullivan decision in 1964, freedom of speech
routinely has displaced the common law of torts in serious and important ways.
Sullivan prohibited a recovery for libel by a local Montgomery, Alabama public
official (Commissioner Sullivan) on a showing of fault by the New York Times
amounting to less than "malice" or "actual malice," which the plaintiff must
20. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First
Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression, 1998 Wis. L.
REV. 905, 955-57 [hereinafter Krotoszynski, The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First
Amendment] (discussing how the Supreme Court of Japan has drawn a boundary line in favor of
protection of reputation over freedom of expression); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., A
Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the
Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1549,
1566-83 (2004) [hereinafter Krotoszynski, A Comparative Perspective on the First
Amendment] (discussing a series of German Federal Constitutional Court opinions embracing
dignity over freedom of speech as a preferred constitutional value).
21. See James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE
L.J. 1279 (2000) (comparing and contrasting rights of personal honor and dignity in Germany,
France, and the United States).
22. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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prove with "convincing clarity., 23 The actual malice standard means that a
media defendant must have published the false statement with either knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement.24
In other words, mere negligence (or any showing of fault less than actual
malice) is not a sufficient legal basis for imposing damages on a media
defendant, at least when the plaintiff is a public officer.25 Subsequent cases
have expanded the Sullivan rule to encompass "public figures"-people who
can command media attention to respond to negative stories in the press (for
example, Jerry Falwell or Tom Cruise).26
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court further expanded the constitutionalization
of libel law. For example, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.27 held that even with
respect to a private figure, the press could not be subjected to presumed or
punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice, provided that the story
related to a "matter of public concern. 28 Moreover, Gertz held that an award
of compensatory damages required a plaintiff to establish some sort of fault on
the media defendant's part.29
This project of constitutionalizing libel law continued into the 1980s. In
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,3 ° the Supreme Court held that states
could not place the burden of proving truth on the media defendant, at least
when a story related to a public official, public figure, or matter of public
concern.31 In other words, the common law rule to the contrary
notwithstanding, the plaintiff affirmatively must establish the falsity of the
statement at issue. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor explained that
"[t]o ensure that true speech about matters of public concern is not deterred, we
hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot
23. Id. at 279-80, 285-86.
24. See id. at 280-81 (describing the benefits to the public welfare of open discussion of
the character and qualification of candidates for public office).
25. See id. at 281-82 (discussing the scope of the "actual malice" standard).
26. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49-51 (1988) (explaining the
theory of the public figure and finding Reverend Falwell to be a public figure for purposes of
applying First Amendment limits to state tort law, including both defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 163-69
(1979) (discussing requirements of attaining "public figure" status).
27. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
28. See id. at 347-50 (1974) (discussing the importance of the plaintiff showing
affirmative misconduct by the press before substantial damages are awarded in defamation suits
involving matters of public concern).
29. Id. at 347.
30. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
31. Id. at 776-79.
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stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of
public concern. 3 2 Thus, a private plaintiff suing a media defendant must show
both fault and falsity if the story, or the precise statement at issue, relates to a
matter of public concern.
The Sullivan line of cases leaves the pre-existing common law rules of
defamation liability untouched only for private party plaintiffs suing a media
defendant where the statements at issue do not implicate a matter of public
concern. 33 This is so only because a majority of the Supreme Court does not
believe that such speech implicates serious, or important, First Amendment
values.34 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., Justice Powell
explained that because of the "reduced constitutional value of speech involving
no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports
awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing of 'actual
malice.' 0
Before moving on to consider the radically different balance that Japan
and Germany have struck between protecting free speech and protecting
personal reputation, I should note that I have never been entirely persuaded that
Sullivan and its progeny strike the appropriate balance here in the United
States. At least arguably, the rules both under- and overprotect media
defendants. For example, I see little reason to protect the media from being
required to publish a correction of a false statement of fact that damages
reputation on a showing of less than actual malice. The marketplace of ideas is
not enhanced by the presence of an uncorrected falsehood, and media should be
required to acknowledge false statements of fact. In this instance, Sullivan
overprotects the press and underprotects public officials, public figures, and
those involved in matters of public concern.
Accordingly, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo36 should be limited
to its facts.37 The Supreme Court should sustain a state law or common law
doctrine requiring publication of a forced correction upon proof of falsity by a
32. Id. at 776-77.
33. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,757-61 (1985)
(describing why speech involving matters of private concern is not accorded the same First
Amendment protection as speech concerning matters of public concern).
34. Id. at 759-60.
35. Id. at 761.
36. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
37. See id. at 258 (holding that the First Amendment precludes state law that requires a
privately owned newspaper to publish a reply to an editorial adverse to a candidate for public
office on theory that free speech and free press guarantees protect a newspaper's editorial
control over the content of the newspaper).
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preponderance of the evidence or, perhaps, by clear and convincing evidence
when challenged on First Amendment grounds.
At the same time, however, the availability of punitive damages is a very
real threat to the independence-indeed the very existence-of media entities.
Unlimited punitive damage awards are a veritable sword of Damocles hanging
over the media; if a plaintiff can meet the actual malice standard, then a jury
may award unlimited, potentially bankrupting, punitive damages (subject only
to the limits that the doctrine of substantive due process imposes).38 Thus, if an
alternative weekly newspaper gets a single story wrong, either intentionally
(perhaps because of a rogue reporter) or inadvertently (perhaps from a single
lapse in journalistic standards in a fashion suggesting "reckless" indifference to
truth or falsity of the story), it faces annihilation. The punishment, frankly,
seems disproportionate to the crime, especially when weighing the newspaper's
future and past value as a purveyor of news and information against a single,
albeit egregious, lapse of judgment.
I should take care to note that these ideas are not original to me; Justice
39White staked out this position in concurring and dissenting opinions.
Moreover, Professor David Anderson has written persuasively about the
theoretical justifications for questioning, and perhaps revising, the Sullivan
balance. 40 Finally, as I will explain in greater detail below, other nations simply
38. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-19 (2003)
(discussing the rationale behind placing due process limitations on punitive damage awards);
BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 568-76 (1996) (stating that "grossly excessive"
punitive damage awards are beyond the limits of due process).
39. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771-72 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring) (arguing that actual malice standard should not apply "where [public official]
sought no damages but only to clear his name"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
388-95 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that limits on presumed and punitive damages
would be sufficient to protect the press adequately and proposing action to clear name without
damages under a less demanding standard than actual malice).
40. See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 487,
488-89 (1991) (arguing that the post-Sullivan landscape of libel law underprotects both the
press and personal reputation). Anderson identifies as particular problems: (i) protracted
litigation with hypercomplex rules and standards; (2) the potential of unlimited punitive
damages against media defendants; (3) the profound chilling effect of both "the damage of
losing a judgment" and "the prospect of having to pay the cost of defending" libel actions;
(4) subjective and intrusive inquiries into media operations; (5) loss of concern and focus on the
truth itself, and (6) creating an "ordeal" for media defendants in which "the blood is often the
defendants'." Id. at 510-24. Anderson suggests possible reforms of libel law that would better
protect both personal reputation and a free press, including clearer rules of liability,
reconsideration of the actual malice standard, and controls on litigation costs, including
declaratory judgment actions that seek to clear reputation without the imposition of substantial
damages. Id. at 537-50; see also William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment Limitations on
Recovery from the Press-An Extended Comment on the "Anderson Solution", 25 WM. & MARY
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do not accept the premise that personal reputation, dignity, or honor should
reflexively give way to create breathing room for free expression.
B. Japan: Tort Liability for Truthful Statements That Injure Reputation
Absent Proof of Truth
Japan provides an instructive example of a nation committed to the
freedom of expression that rejects the Sullivan metric. Japanese law provides
for civil and criminal liability for truthful statements that damage or injure
reputation. 4' The Supreme Court of Japan, however, has created a limited
privilege to statutory liabilities for information related to public figures or
matters of public concern where the defendant can establish a good faith
mistake of fact.42
Consistent with this approach, the Supreme Court of Japan has affirmed a
lower court's decision to issue an injunction against the distribution of a
magazine featuring a highly unflattering portrait of a candidate for governor of
Hokkaido.43 The Supreme Court held that an injunction against publication or
distribution of a periodical may issue "only when it is obvious that the contents
of expression are not true or its objectives are not solely in the public interest,
and, moreover, when the victim may suffer serious and irreparable damage."
44
The story at issue in the case, entitled An Authoritarian's Temptation,
described the candidate, Kozo Igarashi, as "skillful at lying, bluffing, and
cheating," "a born liar," "an opportunist without scruples, doing anything for
his own interest and his own success," and, more colorfully, as "a cockroach,"
L. REV. 793, 793-94 (1984) (arguing that Sullivan both overprotects and underprotects the press
by making publishers vulnerable to "spectacular awards of damages when the proper modicum
of scienter has been shown" while also "operat[ing] to defeat claims unfairly" when "people who
lack the personal means of publicity to correct false and damaging statements that have hurt
them, but who cannot satisfy the actual malice standard").
41. See Krotoszynski, The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First Amendment, supra
note 20, at 953-54 (noting that truthful statements that injure reputation are actionable in Japan,
absent an affirmative defense provided by judicial glosses on the civil and criminal codes).
42. See id. at 953-64 (describing and critiquing the Japanese approach to protecting both
free speech and personal reputation).
43. See Hoppo Journal Co. v. Japan, Judgment upon Case of Constitutionality of the
Advance Judgment Against Publication of Magazine in Relation to Freedom of Expression,
Series of Prominent Judgments of the Supreme Court upon Questions of Constitutionality No.
22 (General Secretariat, Supreme Court of Japan, 1988) (decided June 11, 1986).
44. Id. at 6.
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an "opportunist," a "magician with words and a street vendor quack," and "a
mayor like the rump of the bitch.,
41
One must, of course, bear in mind that Igarashi was an active candidate for
elected office; the piece also made direct political arguments regarding his
merit as a candidate. The Hoppo Journal argued that Igarashi was "a useless
and pernicious person to Hokkaido" and that "the Japan Socialist Party should
change the candidate for governorship immediately if reform is earnestly
sought., 46  Notwithstanding this context, the Supreme Court of Japan
considered the insulting adjectives to constitute false statements of fact that
properly engendered liability for libel and that justified a prior restraint against
distribution of the Hoppo Journal.
47
C. The Triumph of Dignity and Personal Honor over Freedom of
Expression in Germany's Basic Law
German law goes beyond the Japanese approach and expressly limits the
protection of free speech when necessary to protect "personal honor." Article
5(2) of the German Basic Law, which serves as Germany's Constitution,
provides that free expression rights find "their limits in the provisions of the
general statutes, in statutory provisions for the protection of youth, and in the
right to respect for personal honor. 4 s Moreover, the Federal Constitutional
Court, the highest judicial authority on matters of constitutional law in
Germany, has held that Article 5 rights are subordinate to rights secured by
Article 1 and Article 2.
45. Id. at 7-8.
46. Id. at8.
47. Id. at 9; see also Krotoszynski, The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the First
Amendment, supra note 20, at 958-60 (discussing and critiquing the Supreme Court of Japan's
resolution of this case).
48. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 5(2) (F.R.G.) (emphasis added). For an
overview of the Basic Law and its history, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CoNsTrrTUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 8-24 (1994).
49. See Tucholsky Case (Soldiers Are Murderers Case), BVerfGE 93, 266 (1995),
translated in DECISIONS OF THE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT-FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1998), at 659,680 (holding that "freedom of opinion
must always take second place where the statement affects another's human dignity"); see also
Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American
Constitutional Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 963, 971 ("[H]uman dignity is the central value of the
Basic Law.").
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Article 1 provides that "[h]uman dignity is inviolable" and establishes that
"[t]o respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority." 50 Article 2, in turn,
provides that all persons enjoy the right to free development of their
personalities.5 ' Claims arising under both Article I and Article 2 take priority
over free speech claims arising under Article 5.52 Moreover, the state must
provide a legal remedy for violations of Article 1 and Article 2, whether or not
the government is directly responsible for the alleged abridgement.
Applying these general principles, the Federal Constitutional Court has
enjoined distribution of a fictionalized account of a pro-Nazi actor, even though
the subject of the account was deceased (Mephisto); a fictional interview,
plainly labeled as such, with the then-Shah of Iran's wife (Princess Soraya); a
factually accurate made-for-television docudrama about a gay robber (Lebach);
and dehumanizing caricatures of an incumbent state elected official (Strauss).
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D. United States Free Speech Values Are Not Universal
In sum, Japan and Germany both value personal honor and reputation
more highly than free speech, even in contexts where Sullivan and its progeny
would apply with full force in the United States. 4 Accordingly, it seems
unlikely that a common accommodation of free speech values could be reached
that would be acceptable to the United States and also to Japan and Germany.55
In fact, if one were to survey the globe, the United States approach, which
protects demonstrably false speech in order to give a free press adequate
breathing room, very much represents a minority approach. Unlike the
protection of trademarks or domain names, an international consensus simply
does not exist presently regarding the recognition, scope, and enforcement of
the right to freedom of expression.
50. GG art. 1(1).
5 1. Id. art. 2 ("Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the
moral code.").
52. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (discussing the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights in Germany).
53. For a discussion of these cases and references to both official German reporter
citations and English-language translations, see Krotoszynski, A Comparative Perspective on
the First Amendment, supra note 20, at 1566-83.
54. See supra Part I1.B-C (comparing the hierarchy of constitutional rights in Japan and
Germany to that of the United States).
55. Bone seems to recognize that consensus might be difficult to achieve. See Bone,
supra note 8, at 297 n.97 (noting that proposed solution "would not necessarily be effective for
disputes like [Yahoo.q]").
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IV. Some Concluding Thoughts on Resolving Global Disagreements
Regarding the Relative Importance of Free Speech and Personal
Honor, Reputation, and Human Dignity
Although I am not hopeful about the prospects for reaching a common
understanding regarding the relative importance of free speech, it might be
possible to find ways of avoiding the conflict in the first place, perhaps by
focusing on choice of law aspects of the problem. Even if agreement on the
proper scope of free speech might be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain,
perhaps agreement on choice of law principles could be reached.
For example, Europeans do not like the United States practice of applying
domestic antitrust and securities law extraterritorially 5 6 If the United States
would agree to safe harbor provisions that would insulate foreign behavior from
antitrust and securities regulations in the United States, other nations might
agree to limit the application of their domestic law of defamation to United
States media entities. Some general principles might include the question of
intentional availment of a market. Simple efforts to discourage foreign
nationals from accessing a given website and nontranslation of materials on a
website from the host nation's most common language might be good starting
points for developing such safe harbor provisions.
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The Yahoo! case, for example, does not feature sympathetic facts for the
defendant. Yahoo! maintained a French language website, with dedicated and
directed French language pop-ups that had links to the United States site that
offered Nazi memorabilia-the sale of which violated French local law.
58
When Yahoo! plainly targets the French market and takes multiple affirmative
steps to entice French customers to use its services, Yahoo!'s claim that it
should not be subjected to French domestic law strikes me as remarkably
unpersuasive.
By similar logic, if Dow Jones voluntarily maintains an active business
presence in Australia and earns profits thereby, I am significantly less
sympathetic about an Australian court holding Dow Jones bound by an
Australian libel law for posting a story that one could reasonably foresee would
56. See Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust and Securities
Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law"Approach, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1799, 1800-
01 (1992) (describing foreign statutes designed to combat extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust laws).
57. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,285-88 (1952) (holding that Congress
may regulate acts undertaken entirely abroad if such acts have substantial domestic effects that
are reasonably foreseeable).
58. Rosen, supra note 4, at 868-69.
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV 339 (2005)
be accessible and of interest to Australian nationals. A U.S. corporation, like
Dow Jones, should not expect, as a matter of right, to conduct local operations
in a foreign country, like Australia, free and clear of local laws.
Suppose, however, that the facts are somewhat different. Suppose that the
website sponsor did not offer foreign language translation of the website's
content; suppose that it featured an opening screen that instructed a user to
"click here" if a "U.S. Citizen or Legal Resident" and "click here" if not, with
those clicking "no" being directed not to access the website. Other rules might
be devised that would serve to limit extraterritorial liability by establishing that
a speaker affirmatively has avoided a particular national market. Thus, as a
matter of comity, safe harbor rules might be developed to protect U.S.-based
speech activities from foreign regulation, in hopes that the United States would
recognize and respect safe harbor rules in other areas of the law, such as
antitrust and securities regulation.59
Finally, websites operated without a commercial motive might be granted
greater freedom and less constraint than those operated for profit. Two reasons
would support such an approach. First, persons or organizations that lack a
commercial motive might lack the financial resources necessary to use the most
effective technology to block or impede access to a website. Businesses and
corporations with a profit-motive for their speech are more likely to be both
willing and able to take measures to mitigate potential extraterritorial liability.
Second, because commercial speech activity is more robust than
noncommercial speech, it would likely survive greater efforts at regulation, and
the chilling effects of regulation would, therefore, be more attenuated. 60 The
United States Supreme Court has endorsed this distinction between commercial
and noncommercial speakers in cases involving regulation of cable channels 61
and the Internet.62
59. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813,817-28 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing the role of "international comity" in
limiting the extraterritorial reach of statutes); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping
"International Comity", 83 IOWA L. REV. 893 (1998) (discussing the vague contours of the
concept of international comity and arguing for the adoption of more precise terminology).
60. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-66
(1980) (sustaining greater regulation of commercial speech than noncommercial speech on the
theory that commercial speech is more robust and, accordingly, less susceptible to being
squelched through government regulation).
61. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,753-66 (1996)
(invalidating federal regulations that burdened noncommercial public, educational, and
governmental cable channels, but not for-profit channels or leased-access cable channels,
partially on theory that commercial motive would incent for-profit and leased-access channel
speakers to incur costs of compliance with decency standards).
62. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997) (invalidating the Communications
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V. Conclusion
In sum, Bone has identified a real problem that will only continue to grow.
Moreover, nations that regulate speech more aggressively than the United
States will care little about the treatment of their nationals in the United States
regarding similar questions because the United States simply does not regulate
speech activity in the same way. The present system of reconciling inconsistent
local speech regulations is something of a free-for-all, in which the mere
presence of assets within a given jurisdiction creates a real risk of
extraterritorial application of domestic defamation law. The development of
safe harbor rules to limit the potential application of domestic laws to speech
largely occurring abroad would represent an important first step in addressing
the problem inherent in the current self-help regime.
Decency Act of 1996, in part because its open-ended prohibitions covered all nonprofit entities
rather than simply commercial entities).

